

THERE was standing room only in a Washington auditorium earlier this month as Department of State employees crowded in to hear Mr Richard V. Allen, Governor Ronald Reagan's chief foreign policy adviser, deliver an address to their "Open Forum."

Mr Allen had elected to speak on "The Theory and Practice of Housecleaning, or How to Survive a Reagan Administration." The men from the State Department wanted to know how far a Reagan administration would change the way American foreign policy is run. Yes, Mr Allen explained with a disarming, urbane charm, there would be some changes.

Still only 44, Mr Allen is a successful businessman with a good academic record who worked as Mr Nixon's foreign policy co-ordinator in the 1968 election campaign. Real power eluded him under the Nixon Administration; on the National Security Council, he battled with Dr Henry Kissinger.

Mr Allen criticises Dr Kissinger for his detente diplomacy and for employing a clutch of young liberals who leaked Government secrets in order to express their opposition to official policy—and so instilled "the seeds of paranoia over leakage" in the Nixon White House.

Some of these appointed like Mr Richard Moose, were later hired by the Carter Administration (Mr Allen notes); others, like Mr Morton Halperin, left Government service for para-academic activities at radical institutes like the Centre for National Security Studies (CNSS).

"Henry thought he could manipulate these people," Mr Allen comments. "In fact, he succeeded in opening the bowels of the Administration to the New Left."

Nixon adviser

After parting company with Dr Kissinger and the NSC, Mr Allen bobbed back for a time as President Nixon's adviser on international economic policy. Then, in 1976, he drafted the foreign policy paper for the Republican national convention.

Later, as chairman of the intelligence sub-committee of the Republican National Committee,

US FOREIGN POLICY RONALD REAGAN'S COUNSELLORS

By ROBERT MOSS

tee, he had opportunity to investigate what has gone wrong, over the years, in Washington's assessments of the Soviet threat, and how better evaluations could be assured.

One of the conclusions that he reached—after studying such notorious intelligence failures as the CIA's under-estimation (by 50 per cent) of the level of Soviet defence spending—was that there is a need for competitive analysis within the Washington intelligence community, as a safeguard against politically-motivated "editing out" of facts that contradict cherished assumptions.

Excellent candidate

There is little doubt that, if Mr Reagan captures the Presidency, Mr Allen will be invited to become his National Security Adviser. One reason why Mr Allen would make an excellent candidate for that job is that he lacks the authoritarian style of some of his predecessors.

A firm believer in teamwork who sometimes describes his own role, modestly, as that of a "traffic controller," he would seek to recruit the widest range of talent available to bring about a radical reshaping of American foreign policy, based on the understanding that the Soviet leadership is bent on world hegemony and has been permitted, by past errors and inertia, to make dangerous headway towards achieving that goal.

No cowboys

Mr Allen has already enlisted the help of an impressive list of advisers on foreign affairs, defence and intelligence matters, whose names are an instant refutation to those who persist in trying to make out that Mr Reagan's counsellors are primitive cold warriors, who divide the world into cowboys and Indians.

In the current issue of COMMENTARY Prof. Richard Pipes (who has publicly joined Mr Reagan's advisers) has published one of the most brilliant summations of Soviet designs that I have ever seen in print. The article points

out that Moscow's expansionist drive derives in part from the fact that the Soviet leadership has no generally acknowledged mandate to rule.

Whatever mandate the regime may claim "derives from the assertion that it represents the vanguard of the majestic force of progress whose mission it is to accomplish the final social revolution in human history. Once this particular claim is given up—as it would be were the Soviet Government to acknowledge the international status quo as permanent—the question of legitimacy would at once drop up."

Stark contrast

Like Prof. Pipes, most of the experts on Mr Allen's advisory council are people who have tried to understand the stark contrast between the ambitions and *modus operandi* of the Soviet totalitarian regime and those of the Western democracies, rather than foolishly attributing our own hopes and fears to our strategic opponents.

On the defence side, Mr Allen has brought in such forthright critics of the controversial Salt-2 Treaty as Mr John Lehman and Mr Fred Ikle, former chiefs of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency; and seasoned military men like Gen. Daniel O. Graham, former chief of the Defence Intelligence Agency, Gen. Edward Rowley, the former military adviser to the disarmament talks in Geneva, and Admiral Thomas Moorer, former Chief of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

On the foreign side, the team can count not only on the immense experience of men like Mr Robert Strausz-Hupé, a former Ambassador to Nato, but on gifted younger analysts like Mr Robert Pfalzgraf, Mr Kenneth Adelman, and on brilliant iconoclasts like Dr Edward Luttwak and Dr Joseph Churbat, a former senior analyst in Air Force Intelligence.

From the intelligence world, Mr Allen has brought Dr Walter Pforzheimer, the former CIA Legislative Council, on to the team. Dr Pforzheimer has assailed the present CIA Director, Adm. Stansfield Turner, for his willingness to submit to the increased "politicisation" of the Agency.

The re-arming of American intelligence would be very high on the agenda for a Reagan Administration.

Nixon's mistake

Mr Allen (whom I have known and admired for some 10 years) told me recently that he wishes to see more authority vested in the Secretary of State under a Reagan Administration. "Nixon's mistake," he observes, "was that he failed to use the Administration as a whole. His people were content to occupy the high ground."

Mr Allen also favours expanding the role of the Office of International Strategic Affairs at the Defence Department as "the legitimate voice of the Pentagon on foreign policy affairs."

Mr Allen wants to recreate the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB) as a council of elders to oversee the work of the intelligence community. This proposal will win widespread endorsement among intelligence professionals.

Not Kissinger

Who would be Secretary of State under President Reagan? No promises have been made as yet. The answer is not Dr Kissinger. Old differences have not yet been smoothed over.

A more likely choice might be Gen Alexander Haig, the former Supreme Commander of Nato Europe who played fireman at the White House during Watergate. He would be a popular choice, not least in Western Europe, where he won many friends and admirers during his time in Brussels. But his recent heart surgery has left a question-mark over his health.

Reluctantly acknowledging the competence of Mr Reagan's foreign policy team as a whole, a West German Social Democrat leader commented: "The Russians must be really scared. It would make one hell of a change to have a team in Washington who know where the places are on the map—and how to get to them."